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Abstract
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The power system is one of the most important critical infrastructures in every country. Losing this critical network, even for a short time, causes the outbreak of some serious problems and impose the irreparable and destructive damages to the national security, economy, and the citizens¡¯ life. This matter causes the power system to be an attractive purpose for terrorist and malicious attacks. Therefore, attackers want to maximally damage the power system, and defenders want to minimize the losses to the system by determining an optimum defense strategy. This strategic behavior between the defenders and attackers has been modeled as a zero-sum game. In this paper, the presented model between the attackers and defenders has been developed based on the expected energy not served (EENS). This new decision-making standard based on EENS will result in better decision-making in comparison to the previous methods. Because some important parameters, including the powerplants features (Maximum Capacity, Derated Capacity States, Forced Outage Rates), and the load features and annual load graph have been considered in this paper unlike the previous papers. The other innovation of this paper is that the game equilibrium point and the best defense strategy have been obtained based on mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE). Meanwhile, a new algorithm has been presented based on genetic algorithm for solving MSNE problem and obtaining the optimum strategy. The effect of recovery budget and the calculation of its optimum amount are studied at the end. The algorithm and method presented in this paper are tested by five-bus system, and the operation of the presented method has been proved.
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Keywords
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Expected energy not served, game theory, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, power system security, malicious attack
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